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Abstract 
Although the number of studies of new political parties is gradually increasing, we 
still lack a comprehensive understanding of when new parties manage to enter 
national parliaments. The objective of this article is to explain the circumstances 
under which new parties enter national parliaments for the first time. Unlike earlier 
research, this study does not focus on individual party families. Instead, generally 
applicable explanations are sought. This is achieved through an examination of the 
importance of the political opportunity structure, that is, the external environment 
new parties face in their quest for parliamentary representation. Using data 
collected for 18 Western European countries for the period 1960-2010, the analysis 
shows that institutional factors are important to understand new party parliamentary 
entry. The sociological factors analysed in the study, however, do not seem to be 
of equal importance. 
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Introduction 
Although the number of studies of new political parties is gradually increasing, we 
still lack a comprehensive understanding of when new parties manage to enter the 
most important political assembly, namely national parliaments. Since only very 
few new parties emerged during the first 70 years of the 20th century, scholars 
showed little interest in the area. According to the frozen party system theory of 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the 1960s’ party systems reflected the cleavage 
structures of the 20th century, with the result that the party systems of the 1960s 
were virtually the same as those of the 1920s. During the last couple of decades, 
however, new parties have more frequently succeeded in entering national 
parliaments. Accordingly, scholarly interest has also risen. Due especially to the 
pioneer contributions of Hauss and Rayside (1978), Harmel and Robertson (1985) 
and the more recent studies by Hug (2001), Meguid (2008) and Hino (2012), a new 
party theory is slowly starting to emerge. Nevertheless, these studies, and most 
others as well, focus either on new party formation or on new party electoral 
success. Although a new party must attain some electoral success to enter 
parliament, parliamentary entry and electoral success are not synonymous. The 
objective of this article is to explain the circumstances under which new parties 
enter national parliaments for the first time. This is achieved through an 
examination of the importance of the political opportunity structure, that is, the 
external environment new parties face in their quest for parliamentary 
representation. 
Since the entry of new parties into parliament is a subject related to research on 
both party formation and electoral success, I will make use of explanatory factors 
tested in prior studies of these specific issues. In short, two different explanatory 
perspectives are employed. Firstly, an institutional perspective postulates that a 
new party’s prospects for successful parliamentary entry are influenced by how the 
political rules of the game are designed. Primarily, attention has been given to the 
electoral system and its impact on new parties. However, there are also other 
institutions of relevance. Rules on public party funding as well as regulations on 
parties’ access to different forms of media potentially facilitate or hamper new party 
possibilities. Also, basic structures of the political system have been hypothesised 
as being significant. Hence, federalism and parliamentary government have been 
argued to be friendlier to newcomers than a unitary presidential political system 
(Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hauss & Rayside, 1978; Hino, 2012; Willey, 1998). 
Secondly, from a sociological perspective it is emphasised that political parties 
arise as a result of conflicts between different groups in society (Ware, 1996). 
However, as major societal changes such as industrialisation, urbanisation and 
economic growth have taken place, social group affiliation no longer necessarily 
determines voting patterns. The strict divisions into social groups were loosened 
when citizens’ opinions and values changed. New dimensions of conflict brought 
new political issues. Since there is a time lag between voters and party movement, 
new niches open up for new political parties (Rydgren, 2003). From a sociological 
perspective, new party formation and ultimately entry to parliament are therefore a 
response to social change. 
This article will go on to survey theories about new parties in order to find out what 
explanatory factors should be tested in the analysis. In the first part of the empirical 
section the development of new party parliamentary entry, both temporally and 
spatially, will be mapped out. This will be conducted using data collected for 18 
Western European countries for the period 1960-2010. In the second part of the 
empirical section the explanatory factors will be statistically tested using 
multivariate statistical methods. Finally, the conclusions are discussed and 
problematised. Bolin ● New party parliamentary entry in Western Europe 
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How can new party parliamentary entry be explained? 
Prior research on new parties is limited in at least two respects. Firstly, it focuses 
on explaining the formation or the varying degrees of electoral success of new 
parties. While party formation and party parliamentary entry are obviously separate 
events and thus potentially explained by different factors, new party parliamentary 
entry and new party electoral success are more adjacent concepts. However, while 
electoral success is an arbitrary concept to some extent, parliamentary entry is 
hard to misinterpret. Entry includes representation and consequently formal 
influence on decision-making. 
Secondly, most of the literature focuses on specific party families, and 
consequently much attention has been given to radical right parties, green parties 
and regional parties. Treating new parties as one homogeneous group of parties 
has not been very common, although there are a number of important studies 
which, to different extents, have done just that (Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hauss 
& Rayside, 1978; Hino, 2012; Hug, 2001; Meguid, 2008). This study aims to go 
beyond party-family-specific explanations for new party parliamentary entry. 
Although previous explanatory studies on new parties have primarily dealt with 
formation and electoral success and not parliamentary entry, this study is guided 
by research from these adjacent areas of research. The results of these studies, so 
far, are rather mixed. While some argue that the institutional setting is of minor 
importance to understanding why new parties develop (Hauss & Rayside, 1978), 
others argue that is does. Hug (2001), for instance, finds that the costs of forming a 
party do matter. Still others have shown that different aspects of the electoral 
system are of importance in order to explain the electoral success of new parties 
(Hino, 2012). In regard to sociological explanations, Harmel and Robertson (1985) 
fail to find any significant effect of various social variables such as population size, 
religious and linguistic heterogeneity, income equality and levels of post-material 
sentiments within the population. Hino (2012), on the other hand, shows how 
different socio-economic factors do affect different types of new parties in different 
ways. 
In essence, it is possible to identify two dominant theoretical perspectives from 
which new party research has been conducted: an institutional perspective and a 
sociological perspective. Together these two perspectives contribute to the 
understanding of what causes new parties to emerge and enter the parliamentary 
arena. Some use the concept political opportunity structure as an illustration of how 
hard or easy it is for outsiders to enter the political system. This concept originates 
from research into social movements and is a way to express the degree of 
‘openness’ or ‘accessibility’ of a political system for political entrepreneurs 
(Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p. 422). While some have a rather narrow definition of 
what should be included, others define it as a broader concept which includes a 
number of factors. Here the concept is used to collect both institutional factors and 
sociological factors under the same heading in order to illustrate the conditions 
under which new parties attempt to enter parliament.  
The new party’s chances of parliamentary entry are consequently dependent on a 
number of factors outside the party. In extreme cases, the political opportunity 
structure is very unfavourable. One obvious example of such a barrier is a high 
electoral threshold. Under other circumstances the political opportunity structure 
can be ‘a perfect breeding ground’ for new parties (Mudde, 2007, p. 202). 
Favourable possibilities for new parties arise when the institutional barriers are low, 
or when there is a widespread view that the established parties no longer represent 
the voters. A benign political opportunity structure can therefore be assumed to be 
a necessary condition for new parties to be elected to the national parliament. 
A word of caution is needed here. Even though this article focuses on an analysis 
of the political opportunity structure, it is important to note that this factor alone European Journal of Government and Economics 3(1) 
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does not determine whether a new party succeeds or fails. For a new party to 
succeed it needs to capitalise on a favourable political opportunity structure, an 
aspect that research has largely neglected so far. Just as new parties are not 
entirely free to determine their own fate (Lucardie, 2000, p. 180), friendly external 
conditions do not automatically translate into new party parliamentary entry. 
Data and measures 
In order to better understand the extent to which the political opportunity structure 
influences the chances of new parties, this study aims to explain the variations 
present in new party parliamentary entry in elections to the national parliament in 
18 Western European countries between 1960 and 2010. The dependent variable, 
i.e. the number of new party parliamentary entries in an election, is defined as a 
first-time entry into the national parliament by a party that was not originally a 
member of the once-consolidated party system, defined here as the period prior to 
1960 (cf. Mair, 1999, p. 210). Excluded from this population are merger parties 
insofar as at least one of the parties included was once a parliamentary party. The 
reason for this exclusion is that mergers differ in a significant way from split parties 
and genuinely new parties. While the latter are additional contestants in the 
electoral race, mergers can be seen as established parties that have simply been 
reorganised; in other words, old contestants in a new guise. Hence, the products of 
mergers arguably have an easier passage than the split parties and the genuinely 
new parties in getting elected for the first time. 
Institutional factors 
The institutional perspective highlights the rules of the political game. Primarily, 
various aspects of the electoral system have been emphasised as being of great 
importance. In studies of new party success, the electoral system is also a 
reoccurring predictor that is included in the analyses (e.g. Hino, 2012; Hug, 2001; 
Willey 1998). 
As early as the 1950s, Duverger (1964) formulated what has since become known 
as Duverger’s Law, in which he stated that ‘the simple-majority single-ballot system 
favours the two-party system’ and ‘the simple-majority system with second ballot 
and proportional representation, favour multi-partism’ (pp. 217, 239). This would 
accordingly lead us to expect new parties to do better in countries with proportional 
electoral systems than in countries with majoritarian systems (Harmel & Robertson, 
1985). However, since only two countries within the data set of this study, namely 
the UK and France, have majoritarian systems, a desirable level of variation would 
not be obtained if only a dichotomised variable had been used. Empirically, it has 
also been noted that it is not necessarily the case that proportional electoral 
systems are more favourable than majoritarian systems from the perspective of 
small parties (Taagepera, 2002). Since the total number of votes required for a 
seat in a country with single-member constituencies can be rather small, a 
dichotomisation might be misleading. It is also conventional wisdom today that the 
nature of the electoral system is not solely dependent on the electoral formula 
(Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1994; Rae, 1967; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). In 
particular, it has been emphasised that the district magnitude can be considered to 
be as important as explicit thresholds when evaluating the openness of a political 
system (Lijphart, 1994, p. 12). There are also studies that have found that the 
district magnitude is positively related to the electoral success of new parties 
(Willey, 1998). 
In other words we cannot, a priori, infer that a country with an explicit threshold has 
a more closed electoral system than one without an explicit threshold without also 
taking into account the district magnitude. Furthermore, thresholds could be set 
both nationally and at constituency level. This might be of importance since, for 
instance, regionally based parties have better chances than parties with electoral Bolin ● New party parliamentary entry in Western Europe 
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support evenly distributed across the country if the seat distribution is mainly based 
on electoral results at constituency level (Bochsler, 2011). 
In order to circumvent these technicalities, various electoral system measurements 
have been developed in order to scrutinise their openness (Ruiz-Rufino, 2007, 
2011; Taagepera, 2002). In this study, Taagepera’s (2002) Nationwide threshold of 
representation, T, will be employed. This measure indicates the percentage of 
votes a party must obtain in order to have a 50 per cent chance of winning at least 
one seat. The threshold is calculated according to 
 
where M is the district magnitude and S the parliament size. Since a country may 
have an explicit electoral threshold, this must of course be taken into account. 
Thus, the effective threshold is set at the higher of these two values.
1 
A couple of additional institutional factors have been identified as potentially 
important for explaining new party success. Firstly, it has been argued that the 
legislature–executive relations of a country matters (Hauss & Rayside, 1978; 
Willey, 1998). In a presidential system the winner-takes-all character of the 
presidential election tends to spill over to the parliamentary elections. Hauss and 
Rayside (1978, p. 37) argue, for instance, that when ‘attention is focused on the 
single office of presidency, its zero-sum nature encourages the bipolarisation of the 
party system and makes it hard for weak parties … to compete effectively’, while 
Meguid (2008, p. 8) asserts that ‘voters do not want to support a candidate whose 
party is perceived to have no reasonable chance of winning the presidency’.  
No presidential system exists in the data presented in this study; there are, 
however, some cases of semi-presidential systems. To test whether this influences 
the prospects for new parties, a dichotomous variable is included in the analysis to 
indicate whether the election is held in a semi-presidential system or not. 
There is also a reason to analyse whether the vertical separation of powers is 
important. Willey (1998, p. 660) argues, for instance, that a new party needs less 
resources to succeed sub-nationally compared to nationally. In addition, local or 
regional electoral success may lead to a decreased psychological effect on voters. 
That is to say, the risk of casting a wasted vote becomes less prominent to the 
voters if the new party has a record of sub-national electoral success that shows 
that there is a real chance of parliamentary entry nationally as well (see also 
Müller-Rommel, 1998). To avoid losing too much information, the vertical 
separation of powers will not be measured according to the commonly applied 
dichotomy of unitary versus federal government. Since it is generally 
acknowledged that both unitary states and federations may vary in the extent to 
which their political systems are decentralised, the level of decentralisation is 
measured according to the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 
2010).
2 
                                                                                                             
1 In this context it is important to emphasise that electoral systems are complex systems and 
comparisons between countries are difficult. There are several different measurements available to 
estimate the properties of electoral systems. Firstly, there are different measures of electoral system 
proportionality (Gallagher, 1991; Loosemore & Hanby, 1971; Rae, 1967). However, since these 
measures are indirectly dependent on whether a new party is elected or not, they are not suitable for 
this study. Secondly, since seats are allocated based on the number of votes at the constituency level, it 
has also been suggested that the analysis should primarily be conducted at this level (Bischoff, 2009; 
Selb & Pituctin, 2010). As the focus of this study is on national parliamentary entry, neither of these 
measures is suitable in this context. 
2 Schakel (2008) shows that the Regional Authority Index is highly correlated with other measures of 
decentralisation. European Journal of Government and Economics 3(1) 
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Finally, two political system factors are also included in the analysis: turnout and 
voter volatility. Regarding turnout, there are well-grounded reasons to expect the 
level to be of importance. There are, however, mixed opinions about how it might 
matter. Some argue that small parties benefit from low turnout (Kestilä & 
Söderlund, 2007; van der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996), the reason being that low 
turnout is a consequence of widespread discontent. Such discontent could be 
expressed either through abstention or a vote for a non-established party (Kestilä & 
Söderlund, 2007, p. 785). Mathematically, low turnout also decreases the absolute 
number of votes needed to overcome the electoral threshold (cf. second-order 
elections, Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Others argue the opposite (Bernhagen & Marsh, 
2007; O’Malley, 2008; cf. Finseraas & Vernby, 2014). This line of argument does, 
however, depart from the notion that abstention is a strategic choice exercised 
when the voter is not expecting his/her preferred party to win a sufficient numbers 
of votes (Jackman, 1987). Consequently, high turnout might signify that voters are 
expressing their political discontent (Poguntke, 1996, p. 328).  
Electoral volatility is also expected to promote new party parliamentary entry. This 
is perhaps best explained by a counterfactual. New parties will not win any votes if 
the established parties do not lose some votes. However, this expected correlation 
needs to be interpreted with some caution since the direction of correlation is not 
easily decided. In short, it might be hard to establish whether volatility causes new 
party parliamentary entry or whether it is a cause of the emergence of new parties. 
Regardless of the direction of the correlation, it seems to be a factor that is of 
interest. To test it, Pedersen’s (1979) index of net volatility, V, is employed: 
 
where pi,t is the share of votes for party p at election t and n is the total number of 
parties. 
Sociological factors 
From a sociological perspective, political parties are regarded as a result of 
different groups requiring societal representation (Harmel & Robertson, 1985, p. 
502). All other things being equal, it might be asserted that big countries therefore 
have a greater number of societal groups with political demands. Hence, we might 
expect there to be a correlation between the size of the country and new party 
parliamentary entry (cf. Tavits, 2006, p. 108). To test this claim, both population 
size and country area will be analysed. Due to the skew distribution, both these 
variables were transformed using the natural logarithm (ln) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006, pp. 86-88). 
A second set of sociological factors deserving interest might be labelled socio-
economic or socio-cultural variables. There are, for instance, well-grounded 
arguments suggesting that new parties are facilitated by transformative events and 
societal unease. Such events, it is believed, cause discontent among voters, who 
spawn a demand for something new. To test this assertion, the analysis also 
includes economic indicators such as unemployment rates, inflation rates and 
economic growth rates (e.g. Arzheimer, 2009; Müller-Rommel, 1998). Changes in 
the demographic composition might also increase the attraction of new parties. 
There is, for example, some support for the claim that a high level of immigration 
explains radical right party success (Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2003). 
The basic variables that were included in the statistical analyses, as well as 
references to the sources from which the information was taken, are listed in the 
appendix, in Table A1. Bolin ● New party parliamentary entry in Western Europe 
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New party parliamentary entry across space and time 
As this study deals with democratic politics in Western Europe, elections in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain prior to 1980 are excluded from the analysis. In all, 18 
countries are included in the study. In these countries, 238 elections were held 
between 1960 and 2010. The distribution of the dependent variable is shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Distribution of dependent variable, number of new party parliamentary 
entries in election 
Number of new party entries  Number of cases  Share of cases, per cent 
0 128  53.8 
1 65  27.3 
2 31  13.0 
3 11  4.6 
4 1  0.4 
5 1  0.4 
6 1  0.4 
Total 238  100 
Sources: Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997), Political data yearbook 1993-2010 (Katz et al., 1993-2010), 
Parties and Elections in Europe (2011), Nohlen and Stöver (2010). 
The most common outcome is that no new party gained representation. New 
parties entered parliament in less than 50 per cent of the elections. In about 27 per 
cent of the elections, one new party entered the highest decision-making body, and 
there are an additional 13 per cent of cases in which two new parties passed the 
threshold of representation. 
The table also shows that it is extremely rare that more than three new parties 
entered the parliament in the same election. Notably, six new parties entered the 
Italian lower chamber in 1994.
3 The other two cases were Spain in 1986 (five new 
parties) and Belgium in 1978 (four new parties).  
The number of new parties viewed in a comparative perspective is presented in 
Table 2. Overall, there were 175 new party parliamentary entries in the 238 
elections held. In other words, on average, in three out of four elections just one 
new party was elected to parliament. Considering the number of parties without 
previous experience of representation that were actually running for parliament, the 
chances for the average party must be considered slim. 
                                                                                                             
3 This explosion of new parties in Italy was a result of the implosion of the old party system, which was 
caused by serious corruption allegations in the so-called Tangentopoli affair. The Italian party system 
was  more or less replaced by a new one over the course of a few elections (Cotta & Verzichelli, 2007, 
pp. 49-65). European Journal of Government and Economics 3(1) 
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Table 2. New party parliamentary entries per country, 1960-2010 
Country Number  of  elections  Number of new party 
entries 
Average number of new 
party entries 
Italy 13  21  1.62 
Spain 8  11  1.38 
Belgium 16  21  1.31 
Netherlands 15  18  1.20 
Switzerland 12  14  1.17 
UK 13  10  0.77 
Finland 13  10  0.77 
Greece 11  8  0.73 
Ireland 14  10  0.71 
Luxembourg 10  7  0.70 
France 12  8  0.67 
Portugal 10  6  0.60 
Iceland 14  7  0.50 
Denmark 19  9  0.47 
Norway 13  6  0.46 
Sweden 16  4  0.25 
Austria 15  3  0.20 
Germany 14  2  0.14 
Total 238  175  0.74 
Note: Correlation eta = 0.41 (p = 0.00) 
This result shows significant differences between the countries in this study. While 
there were 21 new party parliamentary entries in the lower chambers of both Italy 
and Belgium, corresponding events were extremely rare in the German Bundestag. 
PDS, together with Die Grünen, were the only two German parties who fought their 
way into the German lower house during the period 1960-2010. A measure of 
association was calculated in order to statistically test the relationship between 
country and the number of new party parliamentary entries. With an eta-value of 
0.41 there is evidence of a medium-strong correlation, indicating that there is an 
independent country effect. 
There is also evidence of temporal variation (see Table 3). While there was about 
one new party parliamentary entries in every second election in the 1960s, this 
increased to almost one new party per election in the 1980s. During the last 
decade, however, there has been a significant change in this trend and we are now 
almost back to the same levels as at the beginning of the period. Compared to the 
spatial variation, the temporal variation is rather small (eta = 0.15). 
Table 3. New party parliamentary entries per decade, 1960-2010 
Decade Number  of  elections Number of new party 
entries 
Average number of new 
party entries 
1960-69 38  21  0.55 
1970-79 48  36  0.75 
1980-89 53  49  0.92 
1990-99 48  40  0.83 
2000-10
4 51  29  0.57 
Total 238  175  0.74 
Note:  Correlation eta = 0.15 (p = 0.28) 
If the decrease in new party parliamentary entries is a trend or a coincidence 
remains to be seen. It should be noted, however, that the high levels in both the 
1980s and the 1990s were, in part, the consequence of new party family 
formations. While the green parties were part of the 1980s’ wave of new parties 
(e.g. Müller-Rommel, 1998), the disparate family of anti-immigration parties won 
electoral success during the period 1990-2000. Possibly, therefore, a completely 
new party family needs to be established if we are to see the same levels of new 
                                                                                                             
4 Since data were collected up until 2010, the last period is one year longer than the previous periods. Bolin ● New party parliamentary entry in Western Europe 
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party parliamentary entries again. On the other hand, the green and anti-
immigration parties make up only a minority of all new parties.  
From descriptive inferences, I now turn to the matter of explaining new party 
parliamentary entry. 
Explaining new party parliamentary entry 
It has not been possible to collect data for all independent variables during the 
whole period of the study. As long as missing data are scattered randomly in the 
data matrix the generalisability is not affected to any great extent (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2006, p. 62). However, since the missing data largely pertain to specific 
years or countries and for a particular period of time, some measures have had to 
be introduced. For this reason, missing data regarding the variables for the 
Regional Authority Index, unemployment, economic growth, inflation and 
immigration have been replaced with values for the closest available period. If two 
values have occurred equally close in time then the mean of these was used. To 
test whether these replacement values have had an impact on the results, all 
analyses were also conducted on the original data set. No relevant differences 
were observed.   
Since no new parties reached the threshold for being admitted to parliament entries 
in more than 50 per cent of the elections, the dependent variable is transformed 
into a dichotomised variable where 0 indicates no new party elected and 1 
indicates that at least one new party was elected. Because of this, the analysis was 
carried out using multivariate logistic regression.
5 Since the data are time-series 
cross-section with a binary dependent variable, there is a risk that the outcome of 
the dependent variable is not independent of previous outcomes. Such serial 
correlation might underestimate the true standard errors and thus may give rise to 
an overestimation of the strength of any correlation (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998, 
pp. 1260-1261). To capture this, a first lag of the dependent variable was included 
in the analysis. 
There seems to be no consensus about which measures best evaluate a logistic 
regression model (Garson, 2012). However, in order to provide sufficient 
information to evaluate the plausibility of the interpretations made, this study 
follows the recommendations of Peng et al. (2002). Firstly, information on whether 
each model performs better than a model with no predictors, the so-called null 
model, is presented. This is done by presenting a -2 log likelihood and associated 
chi-square values. A significant chi-square value signals that the model is 
significantly better than the null model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006, p. 448). 
Secondly, information is provided on how well the model performs using the 
Nagelkerke R square. Although this measure is not equivalent to the R-square 
value which is usually presented in OLS regression, it is often used to provide an 
intuitive picture of how well the model explains the phenomenon under study. The 
Nagelkerke R square is also supplemented with data on what proportion of the 
outcomes is correctly predicted. Finally, the individual independent variables are 
evaluated through the presentation of coefficients, significant tests and odds ratios 
in order to give an idea of how much each factor affects the probability of new party 
                                                                                                             
5 An alternative to this would be to use a count model in which the dependent variable is the number of 
times something has occurred (Long, 1997, p. 217). Since new party entrances are rather rare events, 
the average of the dependent variable is close to 0 and similar to a Poisson distribution. However, a 
Poisson regression model assumes that each event must be independent of other events (King, 1998, 
p. 50) and that the variance of the dependent variable is equal to its mean (Dunteman & Ho, 2006, p. 
23; Hoffmann, 2004, p. 104). Since these requirements are not met, the negative binomial distribution is 
a more appropriate statistical tool (Hoffmann, 2004, p. 12). In order to test the robustness of the logistic 
regressions, this regression model was also estimated. The result from this analysis provides no reason 
to change the overall conclusions drawn in this article. European Journal of Government and Economics 3(1) 
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parliamentary entry. To illustrate the probabilities, the presentation of the analysis 
is also illustrated with two graphs. 
Table 4 presents the results of three logistic regressions. In the first model, the 
institutional factors are tested. The second model tests the sociological factors, 
while the third model includes all independent variables. The first aspect that is 
worth noting is that while both the institutional and the full models are significantly 
different from the null model, the sociological model is not (Chi square = 10.639, df 
= 7, p = 0.155). For this reason, the following presentation therefore focuses on the 
other two models. 
With Nagelkerke R-square values of 0.16 and 0.18 and correctly predicted 
outcomes of 67.5 per cent (compared to 53.6 per cent in the null model) and 70 per 
cent (54.1 per cent) respectively, one might argue that the overall performance of 
the two models is rather moderate. To fully understand new party parliamentary 
entry, we might therefore conclude that other important factors exist, factors which 
are not included in the models. 
The effective threshold and volatility both have significant and independent effects 
on new party parliamentary entry. While this is true for both the institutional model 
and the full model, it is also possible to conclude that turnout is significant in the 
latter. With a negative coefficient, support is given to the argument that increased 
turnout reduces the likelihood of new party parliamentary entry. It is also important 
to note that none of the sociological predictors reach the level of significance. 
The odds ratios illustrate the importance of the individual explanatory factors for the 
probability of a new party entering parliament. In both the institutional and the full 
models the odds ratio for the effective threshold is about 0.7. This means that the 
odds of at least one new party entering parliament are reduced by almost 30 per 
cent and there is an increase in the effective threshold of one percentage point. 
The odds ratios for volatility and voter turnout indicate that the effect of these 
variables is smaller. The odds for new party parliamentary entry are expected to 
increase by about 8 per cent if volatility is increased by one unit. The 
corresponding change in the odds is less than minus 3 per cent units for a 1 per 
cent unit increase in turnout. Small numbers, however, are not necessarily the 
same as marginal importance. In order to capture fully the extent to which these 
factors influence the chances of new party parliamentary entry, graphical 
presentation is helpful. Bolin ● New party parliamentary entry in Western Europe 
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Table 4. Logistic regression: New parliamentary entry 
 Institutional  model  Sociological model  Full model 
  B (s.e.)  Odds ratio  B (s.e.)  Odds ratio  B (s.e.)  Odds ratio 
Effective threshold  -0.326** 
(0.138)  0.722     -0.307** 
(0.155)  0.735 
Executive  -0.141 (0.487)  0.868      0.278 (0.541)  1.321 
Regional Authority 
Index  0.001 (0.017)  1.001      0.024 (0.025)  1.025 
Turnout  -0.020 (0.013)  0.980      -0.024* (0.014)  0.976 
Volatility  0.076*** 
(0.020)  1.079     0.076*** 
(0.021)  1.079 
Population (ln)      0.086 
(0.122)  1.090 -0.115  (0.173) 0.891 
Area (ln)      -0.210 
(0.135)  0.811 -0.144  (0.163) 0.866 
Unemployment rate      0.055 
(0.034)  1.057 0.042  (0.036) 1.043 
Economic growth 
rate     0.016 
(0.050)  1.016 0.040  (0.053) 1.041 
Inflation     0.023 
(0.018)  1.023 0.022  (0.019) 1.023 
Net migration      0.001 
(0.033)  1.001 -0.001  (0.035) 0.999 
Lag dependent 
variable  0.114 (0.292)  1.121  0.523* 
(0.272)  1.687 0.123  (0.299) 1.130 
Constant 1.208  (1.089)    1.151 
(1.316)   3.336*  (1.975)  
           
           
-2 log likelihood  296.710    312.043    286.721   
Chi2 30.622***   10.639   34.735***  
Nagelkerke  R2  0.162   0.059   0.185   
Correct predicted 
(intercept only)  67.5 (53.6)    59.4 
(54.3)   70.0  (54.1)  
N  237   234   233  
Note: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 
Perhaps the easiest way to grasp an understanding of the significance of odds 
ratios is to convert them to probabilities and illustrate them in line graphs. Figure 1 
and Figure 2 present the predicted probabilities that at least one new party enters 
parliament following the election. The graphs are derived from estimates in the full 
model, and each variable, apart from the two analysed in each figure, is held 
constant at its mean value. Figure 1 shows the plots for the predicted probability of 
new party parliamentary entry for three different levels of electoral volatility as well 
as for the effective threshold. The graph shows that the predicted probability of new 
party parliamentary entry when the electoral volatility is held at its mean (12 per 
cent) is about 70 per cent if no electoral threshold exists at all. With a mean 
effective threshold of 2.1 per cent the predicted probability of a new party 
parliamentary entry is about a 56 per cent chance. The figure also presents the 
predicted probabilities for the minimum and maximum values of electoral volatility. European Journal of Government and Economics 3(1) 
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of new party parliamentary entry; effective 
threshold and volatility 
 
In Figure 2, three levels of turnout are plotted against effective thresholds. The line 
for the mean turnout is identical to the line for mean electoral volatility in Figure 1. 
The graph illustrates that low turnout is expected to increase the chances of new 
party parliamentary entry. Actually, with a minimum turnout (42 per cent) and an 
effective threshold below 1.5 per cent, there is a predicted chance of more than 80 
per cent for a new party parliamentary entry. However, these low levels of turnout 
are rare. Since turnout is somewhat unevenly dispersed (median = 82.8 per cent) it 
might therefore be interesting to compare the lines of the mean and the maximum 
turnout. Here, it can be observed that the differences between these lines are 
rather small. This indicates that the actual impact of turnout, albeit significant, is 
rather marginal. Bolin ● New party parliamentary entry in Western Europe 
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Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of new party parliamentary entry; effective 
threshold and turnout  
 
The overall impression of the statistical analysis is that the institutional perspective 
can, in part, explain new party parliamentary entry, while the sociological 
perspective is less supported in this study. In the final section these results are 
discussed and problematised. 
Concluding remarks 
The party systems of Western Europe are no longer frozen. Ever since the 1960s, 
new parties have been making inroads into national parliaments. The situation, 
however, is not the same in all countries. Whereas countries such as Italy and 
Belgium have experienced a veritable explosion of new parties in their national 
parliaments, other countries, most notably Germany, almost never experience new 
party parliamentary entry. While there might be many reasons for why this variation 
exists, this article has primarily dealt with the environment in which new parties 
attempt to win representation. Under the epithet of political opportunity structure, 
theoretically derived explanatory factors have been tested from both an institutional 
and a sociological perspective. The results are mixed. While the institutional 
perspective provides us with some explanatory power, the sociological perspective 
contributes less to our understanding. 
The finding that the electoral system is important is hardly surprising and is well in 
line with prior research on related research questions such as what accounts for 
new party formation and electoral success (e.g. Hino, 2012; Willey, 1998). This 
finding is also of practical importance for policymakers. However, since 
constitutional politics, like any other policy area, is decided by the established 
parties, perhaps we should not expect this knowledge to be of much help for 
fledgling political parties. Much less so if we are to believe the abundance of 
literature on party cartelisation (e.g. Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009). As expected, there 
is also a strong relationship between electoral volatility and the occurrences of new 
party parliamentary entries. Perhaps more revealing is the fact that new parties 
seem to prosper when there is low turnout. While this has been suggested in 
previous studies, there are also many that have argued the opposite. From a new 
party perspective this finding might open up avenues of potential success, since European Journal of Government and Economics 3(1) 
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low expected turnout, typical in so-called second-order elections, would enthuse 
full mobilisation. 
There are several potential reasons for the poor results from the sociological 
perspective. Firstly, there might of course be methodological issues of concern: 
perhaps important explanatory factors have been omitted. Secondly, there is 
always a risk that secondary data fails to meet the strongest criteria of 
comparability. However, and perhaps most importantly, in the light of this study, the 
weak support for the sociological perspective suggests that there are few such 
factors that influence all new parties in the same way. While high levels of 
immigration might have an impact on the vote for anti-immigration parties, the 
same might not be true for, say, green parties. Also, while many argue that far right 
parties would prosper during an economic downturn, recent analysis suggests that 
they have not experienced any uniform electoral upswing despite the major 
financial crisis from 2008 onwards (Mudde, 2010). 
It can be ascertained that, to some extent anyway, one of the aims of this paper, 
namely to find generic explanations for new party parliamentary entry, proved to be 
difficult to achieve. Therefore, one of the conclusions of this study is that although 
new parties share some similarities, we still need to differentiate between different 
groups in order to fully understand when and why they manage to gain 
representation. Furthermore, and regardless of the findings in this article, the 
political opportunity structure is just one side of the story. For new party 
parliamentary entry to occur, agency is also necessary and should therefore be 
taken into account (Bolin, 2012; Bolleyer 2013). Recent studies have, for instance, 
suggested that new party success is also dependent on both the actions taken by 
the established parties (e.g. Meguid, 2008) and the resources available to the new 
party (e.g. Lucardie, 2000). Of course, it is also important to note that new parties 
differ in terms of the extent to which they actually aim for parliamentary entry. While 
some parties are intrinsically vote-seeking and regard parliamentary entry as 
crucial, others primarily aim to put new or non-politicised issues on the agenda (cf. 
Strøm, 1990). Although there seems to be little to suggest that such goals do vary 
systematically between different countries, it is important to acknowledge that 
strategic considerations on behalf of new parties are also of relevance if we are to 
fully grasp why specific parties do or do not attain parliamentary representation. 
So, while this article has furthered our understanding of the importance of the 
external environment, more work needs to be done in order to gain systematic 
knowledge of the actions taken by new parties and to what extent these parties can 
be masters of their own destiny. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variables and sources 
Variable Sources 
Number of new party 
parliamentary entries 
Based on election results presented in Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997),  
Political data yearbook 1993-2010 (Katz et al., 1993-2010), Nohlen 
and Stöver (2010), Parties and Elections in Europe (2011)  
Effective threshold  Lundell and Karvonen (2011), own calculations 
Executive  Lundell and Karvonen (2011) 
Regional Authority Index  Hooghe et al. (2010) 
Turnout  Lundell and Karvonen (2011) 
Volatility Knutsen  (2011) 
Population  Lundell and Karvonen (2011) 
Country area  Lundell and Karvonen (2011) 
Unemployment rate  Armingeon et al. (2011), OECD (2010a, 2011) 
Inflation  World Bank (2011) 
Economic growth  World Bank (2011) 
Net migration  OECD (2010b) 